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1. KNOWING HOW TO GO ON IN MATHEMATICS1 
 
Mathematical knowledge is generally understood to be a special kind of knowledge, with 
a peculiarly impressive epistemic authority. This is sometimes expressed by stating that 
mathematics is necessarily true, or as some philosophers like to say, true in all possible 
worlds. But why do we believe this of mathematics, and not other sciences, such as 
physics? It has been suggested that this is because mathematics studies special kinds of 
objects (which live somehow 'beyond' the world we inhabit).2 But what makes these objects 
special? One might be tempted here to posit so-called “necessary objects”, drawing on a 
venerable history leading back to Plato, who suggested that mathematical objects were 
endowed by their necessity with a special edifying character, so that a sign purportedly 
hung over the entrance to his Academy stating: “Let no-one ignorant of geometry enter 
                                                
(*) Deakin University, c.legg@deakin.edu.au 
 
1 For discussions which threw helpful light on this paper I’m grateful to Jeff Downard, Bill McCurdy, 
Matthew Moore and of course Fernando Zalamea. 
2 See for instance [Balaguer 1998]. 
 8 
here”.3 Yet what sort of thing could a “necessary object” be? In what does its necessity 
consist? The idea received stern rebuke in the mid-20th century as a holdover of alleged 
medieval mysticism from W.V.O. Quine, who stressed that necessity pertains not to things, 
but only the truth of sentences,4 producing a fear of “Platonism” that lingers in the minds 
of many analytic philosophers today.5 One reason many philosophers view mathematics as 
necessarily true is that mathematics seems paradigmatically certain. This appears 
undeniable insofar as mathematicians do not change their minds on specific questions 
nearly as often as, say, physicists. Once a mathematical proof is produced and rigorously 
checked, mathematicians tend to accept it from then on. But an interesting question now 
arises: in virtue of what does mathematics enjoy this remarkable level of certainty and 
agreement?  
One common, though usually unarticulated, answer to this question will be the focus 
of this paper. This answer is that mathematics is developed by defining and then following 
rules.  Thus “+2” has been presented (in discussions of rule-following initiated by the later 
Wittgenstein), as an example of a mathematical concept which demonstrates this rule-
following character.6 John McDowell [McDowell 1994] and Crispin Wright [Wright 1989, 
2007], following Wittgenstein, have called this understanding of rule-following as certain 
and binding: “rules as rails”. And this seems like a useful metaphor. How could 2 + 2 be 
anything but 4? If I were to sincerely assert, for instance, “2 + 2 = 5”, wouldn’t I be “going 
off the rails”? 
This picture of mathematics as defined and justified by “rules as rails” is perhaps 
overly encouraged by the way the subject is taught in elementary schools, as a set of 
algorithms with clear right and wrong answers. Yet excessive codification of mathematics 
into rules can directly block mathematical insight. This is nicely demonstrated by the 
                                                
3 The sign must have been heeded to at least some degree, as Plato became known as the “maker of 
mathematicians”.  
4 “Reference and Modality”, in [Quine 1953]. 
5 See for instance [Benacerraf 1973]. 
6 Here it must be admitted that this simple concept represents the lowest level of mathematical development. 
The fact that philosophers have taken it as representative of mathematics as a whole is part of a problematic 
which will be noted in this paper, and is incisively diagnosed in [Zalamea 2012b].  
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example in Fig. 1 of a third-grade mathematics teacher marking down a student’s test, 




Figure 1  
A pupil is rebuked for utilising a mathematical identity 
 that his/her teacher does not recognise 
 
Here the student is asked to use “the” (sic) repeated addition strategy to solve the  
multiplication problem: “5 x 3”. It is true that all multiplication problems in elementary 
arithmetic reduce to such concatenated addings, and that this is an important mathematical 
insight to grasp at that level. Yet the ‘repeated addition’ relationship cuts both ways - it 
may be constructed from either multiplicand. Whilst this student appears to have in fact 
chosen the more elegant (shorter) version to calculate, the teacher seems wedded to the 
left-hand multiplicand representing the number of additions and the right-hand 
representing the value that is repeatedly added, despite the fact that this distinction is 
arbitrary and that (at least in elementary mathematics) these two ways of calculating always 
give the same answer. So the teacher ‘corrects’ the student on that basis, even though one 
might argue that the student here has an understanding that the teacher lacks.  
I believe that this example nicely encapsulates why we need a richer account of 
mathematical practice and insight than “rules as rails”. We need an account which 
                                                
7 https://www.reddit.com/r/pics/comments/3pmyh3/teachers_logic_in_grading_math/, downloaded October 
28, 2016. 
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acknowledges and explains how mathematicians do not merely follow definitions laid out 
in advance, but often make discoveries which are radically new, although (what is perhaps 
most intriguing) those discoveries can always be demonstratively proven in hindsight. This 
paper will make some preliminary moves towards such an account, proceeding as follows. 
I will first discuss some failures of the “rules as rails” model which have been noted in 
discussions of the later Wittgenstein’s so-called “rule following problem” (§2). I will then 
draw on the distinctive resources of Charles Peirce’s philosophy to diagnose the rule-
following problem and introduce some conceptual tools for resolving it (§3), then critically 
reflect on this solution. At this point some further insights will emerge: that a certain ‘basic 
empiricism’ very much taken for granted in analytic epistemology is in fact incorrect (§4), 
not least because of the important role in gaining mathematical knowledge played by 
hypostatic abstraction (§5). The paper will close with some reflections on realism in 
mathematics (§6).  
This paper would have been impossible without the wonderful intellectual 
stimulation of the 2015 “Peirce’s Mathematics” conference at the Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, and reading Zalamea’s groundbreaking books bringing mathematical ideas into 
philosophy [Zalamea 2012a, 2012b]. Writing this paper has also given me the opportunity 
to draw together in new ways ideas that I have published in a number of past papers on a 
wide variety of topics, thereby serving as a pivot for reflection that I have found very 
illuminating, and hope will be of some benefit to others. In writing on these topics I must 
however apologise for my profound lack of knowledge of real debates in mathematics as 
the discipline has moved from its late 19th century preoccupation with set theoretic 
‘foundations’ into its ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ phases, as described in [Zalamea 
2012b]. I also apologise for being still entangled in ways that I am sure I am still unable to 
fully understand in ways of thinking drawn from analytic philosophy according to which, 
sadly, “…the range of mathematics…is reduced to a lattice of logics and classical set 
theory” [Zalamea 2012b, p. 102], so that “analytic philosophy…has turned its back on and 
has abandoned high mathematical creativity…thereby estranging itself from the real center 
of the discipline that helped it to emerge” [Zalamea 2012b, p. 87].   
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2. THE “RULE-FOLLOWING” PROBLEM8 
 
The naïve understanding of mathematical epistemology as “rules as rails” has faced some 
upheaval in discussions of the so-called rule-following problem, which draws specifically 
on mathematical examples to conjure an apparently severe scepticism. I will now outline 
the problem. [Kripke 1982], citing [Wittgenstein 1951], invites us to imagine some number 
larger than we have ever added before. (For simplicity’s sake, he calls it 57).  He then 
invites us to imagine a “bizarre sceptic”, who declares that the answer to the sum “68 plus 
57” should be 5! When we protest that this strange answer is obviously not following the 
rule for adding, the sceptic claims that what we mean by addition is in fact the ‘quus’ 
function:  
     x quus y       = x + y, if x and y are less than 57  
   = 5 otherwise.  
If I have never added numbers greater than 57, how can I prove to the sceptic that 
that is not what I meant by addition, in all previous cases? Kripke insists that the rule-
following problem involves both epistemological and metaphysical dimensions. The 
epistemological dimension is that I cannot justify deriving the answer 125 - not 5 - to the 
sum 68 + 57, given that I have never added numbers over 57 before. The metaphysical 
dimension is that there is no fact about me which determines whether I mean plus or quus. 
Kripke concludes that, as incredible as it may seem, we really have no justification for 
extending our meanings in the way we do, if we consider ourselves in isolation. He claims 
this is “the most radical form of scepticism philosophy has seen to date”, which in 1962-3 
struck him “with the force of a revelation” [Kripke 1982, p. 1].  
Kripke considers and rejects a number of purported solutions to his “paradox”. I will 
discuss two. The first is that our ‘adding dispositions’ determine how we should go on. Just 
as delicate crystal has the disposition to shatter if knocked, we have the disposition to 
produce “125” as the answer to “68 + 57”. This is often offered as a ‘naturalistic’ answer 
to the rule-following problem. But the problem with this answer is that our dispositions are 
finite (as we are finite creatures), while our mathematical practice is potentially infinite. So 
                                                
8 This section is adapted from section 1 in [Legg 2003]. 
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the answer seems incomplete at best. A further problem with ‘naturalistic’ solutions to the 
paradox is that what we want is not a descriptive theory of what we do do, but a normative 
theory of what we should do (which, ideally, gives us the reason why we should do that 
thing). We also want to leave room for it to be true that we make mistakes in mathematics. 
Wittgenstein broaches this issue by talking about how we think of rules in terms of a 
“machine-as-symbol”. This is a confused picture, he suggests, because for instance we 
imagine that the machine-as-symbol (unlike a real machine) “never breaks down” 
[Wittgenstein 1953, §193].  
The second purported solution to the rule-following problem I shall discuss is that 
“a special feeling” determines how we should go on. Kripke gently mocks this idea: 
 
[S]uppose I do in fact feel a certain headache with a very special quality whenever I think of 
the ‘+’ sign. How on earth would this headache help me figure out whether I ought to answer 
‘125’ or ‘5’ when asked about ‘68 + 57’?... If there were a special experience of ‘meaning’ 
addition by ‘plus’, analogous to a headache, it would not have the properties that a state of 
meaning addition by ‘plus’ ought to have – it would not tell me what to do in new cases  [Kripke 
1982, pp. 41-43]. 
  
 
We shall see that it is a pity Kripke does not give this response more serious consideration. 
Kripke concludes that, crazy as it seems, his rule-following paradox cannot be solved. He 
offers a merely “skeptical” solution to it which replaces truth conditions for rules such as 
‘+2’ with justification or assertability conditions, as follows: 
 
All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be 
roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertible, and that the 
game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that ‘facts 
correspond’ to those assertions is needed [Kripke 1982, pp. 77-78].  
 
 
Thus, there is no further fact about what a rule means than what my language-using 
community happens to do. If we follow this conclusion into mathematics, we must infer 
that there is no mathematical truth over and above what mathematicians currently assent 
to, and that mathematical meaning does not outrun what mathematicians currently 
understand. This seems so dreadfully conservative that surely it serves as a reductio ad 
absurdum of whatever philosophical arguments led to it.  
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3. A PEIRCEAN APPROACH TO THE RULE-FOLLOWING PROBLEM9 
 
The rule-following problem has perplexed philosophers and generated a vast literature 
attempting to ‘solve the problem’. From the perspective of Peirce’s philosophy, I believe 
the problem derives initially from conflating what are in fact two separate questions: 
1) What makes me able to project rules into new cases? (How do I go on?) 
2) What makes my projection into new cases right? (How do I go on correctly?) 
The fact that the rule-following problem is introduced using a mathematical example 
arguably obscures this distinction very unhelpfully, as the relationship between merely 
applying concepts and determining their correct application is especially close there. But 
speaking generally, why should a person’s grasp of a concept deliver infallible insight into 
the truth or otherwise of all sentences containing it? Presenting a Peircean solution to the 
rule-following problem will give us a different – and I believe richer – understanding of 
the nature of mathematics and its characteristic necessity than our picture of “rules as rails”.  
To approach the problem from the Peircean direction, we need to take a brief look at 
his three philosophical categories, or ‘modes of being’. These offer a direct challenge to 
Quine’s view, now dominant in analytic philosophy, that there is just one mode of being, 
existence, and “to be is to be the value of a bound variable…” (in our best scientific 
theory). Why does Peirce claim that his fundamental categories are three? We shall begin 
by asking: What is the opposite of the particular? This is usually thought to be “the 
general”, or universal – thus reality is thought to be composed of particular entities 
instantiating universal entities, and a certain hylomorphism has descended through 
Western metaphysics since Aristotle. Yet if we identify the particular with the Actual 
(discrete entities that exist and engage in efficient causal interaction, which Peirce calls 
‘Secondness’ because existential interaction requires two entities), Peirce notes that it is 
properly counterposed by both the Possible and the Necessary. The Possible, Peirce calls 
Firstness because it represents the radically new – what can appear on its own and is 
indescribable in any other terms, and is in that sense monadic. A key example of Firstness 
is feeling in the sense of irreducible qualia such as the taste of pineapple. Meanwhile Peirce 
                                                
9 This section is adapted from section 2 in [Legg, 2003]. 
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gives the name Thirdness to what exemplifies a kind of ‘meaning necessity’ whereby 
reality is mediated by concepts that render it intelligible, such that if we understand the 
concept ‘white’, we know that certain other things must also receive the label. This is triadic 
because mediation requires two entities to be ‘bridged’ by a third. Such three-way 
relationships occur in both physical and mental ‘worlds’, and thus signs (which have both 
a material and a logical side) form part of a broad evolutionary system which develops 
according to final causation. All of this raises the intriguing idea that to treat generality as 
univocal has been a profound mistake of Western philosophy since Plato. Such, then, are 
Peirce’s categories, and they appear – together and irreducible to one another – in every 
area of thought (Zalamea identifies them in mathematics itself in an intriguing manner as 
‘eidal’, ‘quiddital’ and ‘archeal’ respectively [Zalamea 2012b, p. 174]).  
Kripke suggests that we have real mathematical rules if the justification that the rule 
provides for going on in a certain way can be shown to be somehow reducible to particular 
existent entities (which Kripke calls “facts”). This can be seen as understanding realism in 
terms of real Secondness only.  Peirce on the other hand argues that we have real Thirdness 
precisely if general concepts are not reducible to particular things: 
 
None of the scholastic logics fails to explain that sol is a general term; because although there 
happens to be but one sun yet the term sol aptum natum est dici de multis. But that is most 
inadequately expressed…the idea of a general involves the idea of possible variations which 
no multitude of existent things could exhaust [CP 5.103]. 
  
Yet Kripke’s sceptic (and many analytic philosophers) will ask – what metaphysics lies 
behind such an understanding? Surely something ‘profligate’, non-naturalistic? Well 
perhaps there is no metaphysics to ‘ground’ our ability to project general concepts, because 
no metaphysics is required. We would not perform experiments in physics to try to observe 
and study the derivative (dy/dx). This would be a hopeless mistake, because the concept 
belongs to mathematics, and physics presupposes mathematics. So why, then, should we 
search in metaphysics for normativity? 
Peirce’s Hierarchy of the Sciences - which arranges disciplines in a partial ordering 
such that they draw principles from sciences above them in the hierarchy and data from 
those below - is sometimes viewed as a quaint relic of 19th century thinking. But it is 
actually a big help in detangling the intimidating knot Kripke tied with his presentation of 
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the rule-following problem. Fig. 2 shows the hierarchy’s top levels, in the 1903 version 




 Peirce’s 1903 hierarchy of the sciences (top 3 levels) 
 
Let us turn back to the rule-following problem in the light of this arrangement. 
 
3.1 The Rule-Following Problem in Phenomenology. 
We see in Fig. 2 that for Peirce phenomenology precedes logic. Its tools are merely 
individual observation, as long as it is candid. This approach might seem epistemologically 
somewhat lax, but when pursuing phenomenology we do not yet have access to a concept 
of truth. (We do not yet even have propositions.) Phenomenology’s methods are to derive 
fundamental concepts and explore relations of reducibility between them. As ‘first’ in the 
three branches of philosophy, phenomenology manifests Firstness, hence the singularity 
(disconnectedness) of the concepts it explores.  
This science is where we explicate rule-following projectibility which, as noted, 
corresponds to how we ‘go on’, and here all we have to do is notice how things appear to 
us. We then note that meanings are projectible, undeniably – this is simply part of what it 
is to mean something. Thus Peirce’s phenomenological treatment of this issue shows that 
at least part of the rule-following problem was lurking where Kripke least expected. There 
is a “special feeling” which guides us in rule-following. Concepts do each have a special 
irreducible quality that allows us to reidentify them in applications beyond the finite set of 











way to describe this quality. In certain places in Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-
following, he seems aware of our having access to such phenomenological resources:  
 
One does not feel that one has always got to wait upon the nod (the whisper) of the rule…we 
are not on tenterhooks about what it will tell us next [Wittgenstein 1953, §223]. 
 
3.2 The Rule-Following Problem in Logic.  
But eventually we have to move beyond merely noting that we ‘feel like’ extending rules 
in a particular way, to considering to what extent we are correct to do so, which leads us 
to the science of logic. Here Peirce defines the concept of truth in terms of the community 
of inquiry and the method of science (even in mathematics, which for Peirce consists in 
‘experimenting on diagrams’, as we shall see). After establishing this epistemological 
framework, we can begin to construct specific propositions (such as 2+2=4) and test them, 
while of course always keeping a fallibilist attitude. 
As noted, it is Kripke’s running together of phenomenology and logic that makes the 
rule-following problem seem hopelessly unsolveable. Only phenomenology can teach us 
that the ‘third’ mode of being is irreducible to the other two. But only logic can show us 
how to determine real from unreal thirdness. No single science can do both of those things. 
In short, Peirce would likely disagree with Kripke’s claim that there is no “straight” 
solution to the rule-following problem. Mathematical truth is objective, although 
mathematical objects do not exist – an alternative that is missed in much contemporary 
analytic philosophy.10 
 
4. CHALLENGE TO BASIC EMPIRICISM I:  
KNOWLEDGE OF NECESSITY AS KNOWLEDGE OF STRUCTURE11 
 
Yet the sensitivity to the Firstness of Thirdness that we12 have is a truly remarkable 
capacity.  Making space for the Firstness of Thirdness would require mainstream 
philosophy to reconceive perception, and, following that, epistemology, in profound ways. 
                                                
10 Most notably in [Benacerraf 1973] and the significant amount of work it has inspired. 
11 This section is adapted from [Legg 2011]. 
12 Who is “we” here? Arguably – creatures who live in the space of reasons. 
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For example, we need to escape a certain basic empiricism, which is greatly taken for 
granted, and may be summarised something like this: 
 
Basic Empiricism: Genuine (i.e. synthetic) knowledge consists in nothing 
but a record of existing objects interacted with causally by the senses.  
 
By contrast, in a recent paper on Peircean modal epistemology, I argued: 
 
Structural articulation is the source of all knowledge of necessity. Necessary reasoning is in 
essence just a recognition that a certain structure has the particular structure that it in fact has 
[Legg 2012, p. 1]. 
 
There I noted a curious feature possessed by the words “in fact” in this formulation. This 
is not a metaphysical but an epistemological “in fact”. It is “…merely meant to invoke 
rhetorically a certain moment of recognition”, where “what is recognised has no content 
over and above what is represented by the structures that are already present, but 
nevertheless constitutes some kind of new insight” [Legg 2012, p. 1]. But how is it possible 
to gain a new insight without seeing any new object? We here turn to Peirce’s insights into 
hypostatic abstraction, as a move in logic. 
 
5. CHALLENGE TO BASIC EMPIRICISM II:  
HYPOSTATIC ABSTRACTION13 
 
Peirce defines hypostatic abstraction as a fact considered as a substantive.  A simple 
example is the passage from “This is green” to “There is greenness in this thing” [Short 
1988, 1997].  As a logical move, hypostatic abstraction was famously derided by early 
moderns as the epitome of pseudo-explanation, following a passage in Molière’s play 
Malade Imaginaire which satirises scholastic philosophy.  In this passage a candidate for 
a degree in medicine is asked during his examination why opium makes people sleepy. He 
replies that it’s because the opium has a dormitive virtue, to loud acclaim from his 
examiners, and laughter from the audience. 
                                                
13 This section is adapted from [Legg 1999]. 
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This diagnosis of comic uselessness is accepted largely without question by 20th 
century analytic philosophers. Thus Quine wrote, “The evil of the idea idea is that its use, 
like the appeal in Molière to a virtus dormitiva, engenders an illusion of having explained 
something” [Quine 1953, p. 48]. Yet Peirce had another view: 
 
You remember the old satire which represents one of the old school of medical men...who 
asked why opium puts people to sleep answers very sapiently “because it has a dormitive 
virtue.”…It is a poignant satire, because everybody is supposed to know well enough that 
this transformation from a concrete predicate to an abstract noun in an oblique case, is a mere 
transformation of language that leaves the thought absolutely untouched.  
I knew this as well as everybody else until I had arrived at that point in my analysis of the 
reasoning of mathematics where I found that this despised juggle of abstraction is an essential 
part of almost every really helpful step in mathematics [NEM 4.160] (cited in [Zeman 1982]). 
 
Peirce refers to hypostatic abstraction as “a necessary inference whose conclusion refers to 
a subject not referred to by the premiss” [CP 4.463]. Such a thing seems extraordinary, 
logically! Yet let us examine our example as an argument: 
(Premise) Sleepiness accompanies opium-taking across a wide variety of 
possible circumstances.   
(Conclusion) There is something about opium which has a soporific effect.  
If the premise really is true, the conclusion arguably follows. Yet the conclusion does 
mention an object not mentioned in the premise (“something about opium…”). This object 
is extremely vague, but is no less new for all that. This is possible because the hypostatic 
abstraction is an ens rationis, which simply means that its being consists in something 
else’s being true.  
How does hypostatic abstraction play an important role in mathematics? Consider 





Proof that 3x2=2x3 
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We may see this diagram as a proof of a number of truths in arithmetic, such as 3x2=6, and 
2x3=6.  But the diagram might also cause one to notice a certain feature of all multiplication 
relationships – that they may be reversed as above. One might then give that feature a 
name: commutativity. This kind of thinking is a lodestone of creativity in mathematics. 
Note what just happened. A new mathematical insight was gained (“There is such a 
thing as commutativity”) without the mind being causally influenced by any new objects. 
Here rationalism outruns empiricism. As McDowell would put it: our knowing minds 
exhibit spontaneity as well as receptivity [McDowell 1994].  Or, as Zalamea puts it: 
 
Peirce’s architectonics postulates a “dialectics” between indeterminations and determination, 
opposing processes of progressive determination … to the constant appearance of elements 
of indetermination and chance (“tychism”) that periodically free the signs from their 
sedimentary semantic load [Zalamea 2012a, pp. 62-63]. 
 
But how do we know that this new insight is true? Again we need to heed the boundary 
between the sciences of phenomenology and logic, and where we stand at any given time. 
The initial hypostatic abstraction is merely something like: “3x2=2x3 exhibits 
commutativity”. This is merely name-giving (again: “a fact viewed as a substantive”). But 
extending the insight further (e.g. “All multiplication is commutative”) will require real 
research in the mathematical community of inquiry. 
The simple picture of mathematical understanding as “rules as rails” is now undone, 
giving us a small glimpse of the profound creativity which drives the discipline.  We can 
now see that hypostatic abstraction (or, as one might express it, “thinking of new ways to 
go on”) has a strong aesthetic dimension of careful noticing the appearance of what is 
before one. Peirce would assimilate this to his category of Firstness. Contemporary 
understandings of reason seem to see it as almost coextensive with algorithmic deductive 
proof (possibly overly influenced by recent research in AI). But an older understanding 
exists in Philosophy whereby it was precisely rationalist philosophers who invoked such 
notions as intuition, and clear and distinct perception.  
Peirce comments insightfully on this aesthetic dimension to mathematical discovery: 
 
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely 
deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other hand, it 
presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising discoveries as any 
observational science. The truth ... appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple 
syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an 
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icon or diagram the relations of whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of 
the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and 
of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts 
[Peirce CP 3.363]14. 
 
This necessary element of creative observation points the way to a further profound 
difference from the rules as rails model. In an important sense, mathematics is not 
epistemologically transparent to itself, but rather full of surprises.15 Although mathematics 
has the reputation of being the most rational of all sciences, ironically, from another view 
(‘looking inside our heads’) it is one of the most mysterious of all, as Peirce noted in a 
number of places:  
 
The action of Nature is a wonder to us; but that of Reason is not usually so…We seem to 
comprehend Reason. We flatter ourselves that we grasp its very noumenon. But it is really as 
occult as Nature. It is only because its effects are for the most part familiar to us from infancy 
that they are not surprising [Peirce 2010, p. 51: “On the Logic of Quantity” 1895]. 
 
... mathematics brings to light results as truly occult and unexpected as those of chemistry; 
only they are results dependent upon the action of reason in the depths of our own 
consciousness, instead of being dependent, like those of chemistry, upon the action of 
Cosmical Reason, or Law [CP 6.594]. 
 
Peirce argued that understanding hypostatic abstraction is particularly important for 
analysing the logic of mathematics because mathematics is particularly prone to 
cannibalising itself by taking its own predicates as objects of investigation (performing 
“operations on operations”). So it is that abstraction reaches heights in mathematics 
undreamed of in the physical sciences. Quine thought that the only question raised by 
hypostasis in the philosophy of mathematics was whether to be ontologically committed to 
classes!16 Thus preoccupied by metaphysics, he completely missed the logical question 
raised by hypostatic abstraction – namely what is its unique and vital role in working 
inference? And moreover, challenging questions such as why such a form of inference 
should be so incredibly useful.17  
 
                                                
14 For a valuable extended discussion of these matters, see [Stjernfelt 2007]. 
15 Zalamea has noted that when contemporary mathematicians are asked to predict how their discipline will 
look in the next few decades, they typically claim to have absolutely no idea [Zalamea 2012b]. 
16 E.g. [Quine 1953, pp. 121-127]. 
17 This paragraph is taken from [Legg 1999, p. 671]. 
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6. MATHEMATICS AS LEARNING ABOUT REALITY 
 
It might here be protested that as we have admitted that hypostatic abstractions are entia 
rationis, they are not real. But this would be to miss just what is distinctive about Peirce’s 
realism: his commitment to the reality of Thirdness. When Peirce looks to the pragmaticist 
maxim for a clarification of the meaning of real, he finds that something is real if “all the 
practical consequences of it are true”. He then notes that the very definition of a hypostatic 
abstraction is of something whose being consists in the truth of another fact. This in fact 
guarantees the reality of the hypostatic abstraction: 
 
On pragmatistic principles reality can mean nothing except the truth of statements in which 
the real thing is asserted. To say that opium has a dormitive virtue means nothing and can 
have no practical consequences except what are involved in the statement that there is some 
circumstance connected with opium that explains its putting people to sleep... Indeed, nobody 
but a metaphysician would dream of denying that opium really has a dormitive virtue [NEM 
4.162].  
 
We need to get past the “tyranny of existence” in philosophy.  Basic empiricism 
claims there is no knowledge except that given by prior causal interaction with existent 
objects. This model has been pervasive through so-called “modern” philosophy. It easily 
generalises to a demand that no belief be accepted except on sufficient prior warrant - 
nowadays frequently referred to as evidentialism. Peirce suggests a whole new model of 
knowledge, based on what we might call future-directed justification, which draws on the 
Biblical maxim, “By their fruits shall ye know them”. Rather than attempting to determine 
prior reasons to hold a belief, this model looks for fruitful abductions.  
And now we come to a key point: A hypostatic abstraction is a doorway to abduction. 
Consider our derivation of the concept of commutativity. Once imagined, this new concept 
becomes an organizing pivot for a host of further explanations in mathematics. Peirce notes 
that abduction is a form of thought that characteristically argues from part to whole of a 
system. He also notes that this is the way mathematical thought grows: 
 
...a mathematician often finds what a chess player might call a gambit to his advantage; 
exchanging a smaller problem that involves exceptions for a larger one free from them. Thus, 
rather than suppose that parallel lines, unlike all other pairs of straight lines in a plane, never 
meet, he supposes that they intersect at infinity. Rather than suppose that some equations 
have roots while others have not, he supplements real quantity by the infinitely greater realm 
of imaginary quantity... [Peirce 2010, p. 31: “Minute Logic” 1902]. 
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The systematic character of mathematical thinking is also unaccounted for by the 
“rules as rails” model. Zalamea expresses this radical turnaround in epistemology towards 
future-directed justification beautifully in his bold and creative rereading of Murphey’s 
famously dismissive “castle in the air” metaphor, which Murphey used to deprecate 
Peirce’s use of the mathematical concept of continuity as the lynchpin of his philosophy: 
 
...explanation is only really needed and appropriately lodged when it goes beyond particulars 
and then fuses into the general (the continuum)...Thus, the logic of abduction becomes in fact 
one of the basic supports of Peirce’s pragmaticist architectonics and general synechism. 
Abduction serves as a regulatory system for the Real, for that plastic weaving (third) formed 
by facts (seconds) and hypotheses (firsts) where hypotheses are subject to complexity tests 
until they continuously fuse with facts … we hope to have been able to show that Peirce’s 
“castle” – very real, but not reducible to existence – is far from just flying in the air [Zalamea 





It is tempting to say that there are moments in mathematics where the talented 
mathematician “goes off the rails”, and sees a different, yet equally necessary way to go on 
in a given mathematical diagram. Such moments have been assumed to be ‘where genius 
is touched by Heaven’ (so to say), and thus ineffable (following the Romantic tradition). 
We have seen in this paper how the “rules as rails” model suggests that mathematical 
results are predetermined by the very definition of mathematical terms, and that insofar as 
this leaves no room for creativity in mathematics, the model is false. Yet where 
Romanticism counterposes against the idea of rigidly determined rules, which we might 
call the Secondness of Thirdness, a kind of pure poesis which we might call Absolute 
Firstness, Peirce is much more rigorous and ambitious than this. He plans to open the 
creative moment to logical modelling – a modelling which constructs none of his 
philosophical categories as opposites but rather brings all three together in structured 
insight.  
To put the same point another way, we might go beyond merely rejecting rules as the 
sole model for mathematical epistemology, to criticise the whole idea of a ‘mathematical 
rule’ as incoherent insofar as it draws on a simple binarism that when one contemplates the 
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true richness of mathematical reality cannot be sustained.  Zalamea discusses how 
philosophers’ unthinking reliance on classical logic and set theory has led philosophers of 
mathematics to an “illusion of precision” [Zalamea 2012b, p. 87] – that any object x either 
has property P or it does not, and correspondingly, the application of the rule which defines 
P to x is either right or wrong. Philosophers have even imagined that such clear boundaries 
are symptomatic of exact thought. Zalamea suggests that nothing could be further from the 
truth, and shows exactly how the naïve assumption is exploded by the work of 
contemporary mathematicians, in that such binary structures form only one small corner of 
a much larger realm of possible structures which it is the mathematician’s task to explore 
(e.g. [Zalamea 2012b, p. 101, p. 177n]).  
Once this is understood, we can uncover a wealth of concepts developed recently in 
mathematics that might be used to lead philosophers’ discussions of ontology beyond 
classical logic and set theory. We might view ontology for instance as “a sophisticated 
sheaf of methods and constructions for systematic explorations of the transitory” [Zalamea 
2012b, p. 90]. Then, as we witness new deep and enigmatic concepts, such as ‘gluings’, 
‘fibers’, ‘coverings’, ‘decantation of reality’, emerging as Firstnesses at the 
phenomenological edge of mathematics, we might compare them with the metaphors 
birthed by our previous assumptions  – such as ‘atomism’, ‘dualism’, ‘foundation’, 
[Zalamea 2012b, p. 343]. We might then decide for ourselves which concepts we might 
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